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I see
developed countries giving economic aid.
And as a result
many people from the third world
are losing their lands,
so the rich can play golf,
or so a dam
can give electric power
to industries with foreign capital.
And the unfortunate people, yes Lord, 
get compensation
for every square meter of their land, 
with money that has the same value 
as a packet of American cigarettes.
W. S. Rendra, For the People of Rangkas Bitung1
The "Land for the People" Calendar
In March 1991 a student from a Yogyakarta activist women's group visited the Inter 
Universities Center office, to ask for a donation for her organization. Her group was one of 
nine sponsors of a calendar called "Land for the People" CTanah untuk Rakyat). The calendar 
attracted considerable comment after she had left, as those in the office at the time crowded 
around, trying to guess which national political figures were being satirized there—not a 
difficult task. About a week later, the government suddenly banned the calender for 
"jeopardizing national security" and for insulting the President and the government of
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on "Indonesian Culture, Asking the Right Ques­
tions," at the Flinders University of South Australia in Adelaide in October 1991.1 would like to express my 
thanks to Nasikun, director of the Social Studies division of the Inter University Center at Gadjah Mada 
University, and Mochtar Mas'oed, the deputy director, for their continuing support of this research.
* Pikiran Rakyat, December 31,1990, reprinted in Problema, no.l (March 1991), p. 13, issued by the Yayasan Buruh 
Membangun.
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Indonesia. The police interrogated thirteen students, university lecturers, journalists, and 
officials, mostly from Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, and the artist who 
created the calendar went underground (and reportedly left the country). The nine non­
governmental organizations that had sponsored the calender publicly claimed collective 
responsibility, in an effort to counter criminal charges being brought against two student 
activists from a non-governmental organization based in Salatiga (the Geni foundation), 
who were backing farmers' requests for higher compensation in the region to be flooded by 
the Kedung Ombo dam.2
The Tanah untuk Rakyat calendar visualizes in cartoon form what the sponsors (and 
many others) believe to be a major social and political issue in Indonesia today—the ques­
tion of land clearances or penggusuran tanah. Various scenes in the calendar illustrate charac­
teristics of many of these recent conflicts; the arbitrariness of official policy, the political and 
physical intimidation of protesters, and the unsatisfactory methods and levels of compensa­
tion for the farmers who have been displaced. It depicts local government officials with 
wads of money bulging out of every pocket of their safari jackets, people being evicted at 
the point of a gun by nasty looking soldiers, with their land being fenced off with barbed 
wire. A large figure dressed in blue pours water into an unfilled hole labeled Kedung Ombo 
while holding a bag of money with "overseas debt" printed on it.
Underneath this collage of social commentary, the creators of the calendar summarize 
six recent clearance cases. These are at Mt Badega (south of Garut), Jatiwangi (near Maja- 
lengka), and Cimacan (in Cianjur kabupaten), all in the province of West Java; Belangguan 
(Situbondo kabupaten) in East Java; Kedung Ombo covering the kabupatens of Boyolali, 
Sragen, and Grobogan (Central Java); and Pulau Panggung subdistrict in South Lampung 
province. The facts about each case as given on the calendar, together with data on the 
Cilacap petrochemical factory and the Urip Sumoharjo urban redevelopment project in 
Surabaya, are summarized in Table 1 (p. 81). Before considering three of these cases in more 
detail, I would like to look briefly at the historical background and the legal position of 
clearance cases in the context of perceptions of land disputes in Indonesia today.
Some Historical Background
The penggusuran issue is closely tied to rights to land and land ownership which have 
long been a complex social issue in Indonesia. In the Hindu Javanese kingdom of Mataram 
before the coming of the Dutch, the ruler distributed land for the people and their descend­
ants to cultivate, or as appanages to faithful followers in return for their loyalty to the king. 
In colonial times, the VOC and the colonial administration that succeeded it tried to make 
sense of the Javanese land-tenure system, for purposes of taxation and later for levying 
corvee. The eighteenth-century debates about rights to land in Java-regarding whether 
ownership of the land resided with the Sovereign (or the State), with proprietors who col­
lected revenue and determined land use, with villages ( or hamlets), or with individual 
peasant cultivators—usually reaffirmed the rights of the sovereign power.3 The Agrarian 
Law of 1870, making it illegal for foreigners to own land, declared that all "unused" or 
unoccupied land belonged to the state, and could therefore be leased to European planta­
tions, while village land could be rented from the village for up to three years. The
2 Kedaulatan Rakyat, March 19,1991; Jawa Pos, March 19,1991; "Kasus Kalender Aneh Bin Ajaib" a pamphlet ex­
plaining the backgrounds of the two students charged, and the activities of the Yayasan Geni, as well as 
providing a summary of local press commentary.
3 Robert Van Niel, "Rights to land in Java," in Dari Babad dan Hikayat sampai Sejarah Kritis: Kumpulan karangan 
dipersembahkan kepada Prof Dr Sartono, ed. T. Ibrahim Alfian et al. (Yogyakarta: UGM press, 1987), pp. 122,135-48.
Table 1. Major Land Clearances in Indonesia 1989-1992
Project and Location
No. of families/ 
total population 
involved





Status of project/ 
total investment Developer
Kedung Ombo dam 
(Central Java)
5390/30000 5968 ha flooded Rp. 300/m2, 
later increased
irrigation of 60000 ha. 
22.5 MW of electricity 
$US76.5 million




468/25000 2348/265 ha. Rp 178-825,000/m2 offices, shopping center, 
hotels, recreation









Shell 52%; Pertamina 15%; 
Bimantara 12%; C. Itoh 9%; 
Mitsubishi 9%; International 
Finance Corporation, Asian 
Development Bank 3%
Airforce base
Jatiwangi (Majalengka) W. 
Java
2198 landholders 1021 ha. N/A Disputed
Koto Panjang dam (Riau) 4125/23000 12600 ha. to be 
flooded
rp. 30/m2 114 MW of electricity 
US$290 million




287 farmers 33.4 ha. cultivated 
since 1943
rp. 30/m2 increased to 
rp. 210/m2.





579/2500 498.6 ha. cultivated 
since 1943
"gift" of 0.12 ha. per 
family




200 families 140 ha. cultivated 
since 1923
rp. 200/m2 marine training PT Asia Budi Daya
Pulau Panggung, South 
Lampung
2376 families 476 dwellings burnt 
by local authorities
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twentieth-century concept of adat law, as applied to land classified as village or communally 
owned land (tanah ulayat or tanahjasan), gave the so-called "autonomous self-regulating 
villages" power to make laws regarding land. Thus the 1870 Agrarian Law recognized a 
dual system of land laws: the Western concept of private ownership (eigendom); and long­
term lease (erfpacht) through which state and village lands could be rented out to Western 
plantations. Although farmers still had rights to land, the power of the sugar interests in 
Java, for example, ensured that farmers were in effect "evicted" from their lands for the 
length of the sugar mill lease (approximately three years). Several of the well-publicized 
disputes in Indonesia today regarding land claims have occurred as a result of farmers 
cultivating land formerly rented under long-term lease arrangements which began during 
the colonial period. The disputes at Mt. Badega and Cimacan, for example, both concern 
land formerly leased to European plantations which was taken over during the Japanese 
occupation by local farmers.
Although all but one of the cases described in Table 1 relate to penggusuran of agricul­
tural land for development projects, there are dozens of similar less-publicized cases which 
concern disputed urban land clearance.4 In Jakarta and Surabaya, the two main urban areas 
of Java, penggusuran of kampung people began to increase in the first decades of the twen­
tieth century. During 1918, in the run-up to the opening of the People's Council (Volksraad), 
Sarekat Islam leaders attacked the Batavia Municipal Council for forcing people off their 
lands in the city's Menteng area "with only paltry compensation" to provide a new Euro­
pean residential area. Stricter housing regulations led to many kampung dwellers being 
forced from their homes, as houses that were below standard were demolished.5 Similar 
clearances were increasingly occurring in Surabaya, a city "originally built in large part on 
illegally acquired kampung land."6
During the Japanese occupation, in order to requisition the maximum amount of rice 
and other resources for their war effort, Japanese authorities returned land previously 
leased by European plantations (including the majority of sugar mills in Java) to the cultiva­
tion of wet rice. In the case of Jatiwangi, in 1943 the Japanese took over land to build an 
airstrip. After the end of the war, the previous owners reclaimed their land and began culti­
vating it, but in 1951, Indonesian airforce personnel took it over, forcibly removing the 
people, although it has never been used as an airforce base since.
From the declaration of Indonesian independence until the passing of the Basic Agrarian 
Law in 1960, the State acted to resume lands where colonial agrarian law had granted legal 
rights of cultivation to foreigners. In 1948 the Republican government revoked 40 sugar mill 
leases of land previously rented from the kratons of Yogyakarta and Surakarta by European 
companies, and negotiated new lease agreements with individual farmers. In 1958 the Indo­
nesian government abolished what were called private lands (tanah partikelir)—created in 
Raffles' day—which saw 1,150,000 hectares mainly owned by British, Dutch, Arab, and 
Chinese interests either sold to the government or distributed to farmers.7
4 The National Assembly (DPR), until the third sitting of the 1990/91 Parliament session, recorded recieving 541 
written complaints about land problems. Editor, December 21,1991, p. 11.
5 Susan Abeyasekere, Jakarta: A History (Singapore, Oxford University Press, revised edition 1989), pp. 106,122.
6 William H. Frederick, Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Athens, Ohio University Press, 
1989), p. 8.
7 Selo Soemardjan, "Land Reform di Indonesia," in Dua Abad Penguasaan Tanah: Pola Penguasaaan Tanah Pertanian 
di Jaxoa dari Masa he Masa, ed. Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro and Gunawan Wiradi (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1984), pp. 
104-5.
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The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960
The Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA, Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria) no 1 of I960, which re­
placed all previous colonial land legislation, is extremely comprehensive. The State, on 
behalf of the citizens of Indonesia, is responsible for the management of land, water, air, and 
all natural resources (article 1). Where not in conflict with national laws, adat or communal 
property rights are recognized and various categories of rights to land are spelled out (in­
cluding ownership, exploitation, building and use rights). All rights to land have a social 
function (article 6). The act gives protection to the interests of the economically weak (article 
11). Issues addressed by the legislation include absentee landholdings, the registration of 
ownership to land and procedures for legal sale and inheritance, and maximum and mini­
mum limits to land holdings. The government is responsible for land use planning or 
zoning.
Under the Basic Agrarian Law the State granted and revoked rights to land. Article 18 
stated that:
For the public interest (kepentingan umum), which includes the interest of the people 
(bangsa) and the state (negara), as well as the collective interest of the people (kepentingan 
bersama dari rakyat) rights to land can be revoked, with the payment of reasonable com­
pensation (ganti rugi yang layak) according to regulations.8
The new act also specified that revocation of rights to land was by presidential decree only. 
In practice, this has been seldom used because later legislation (Permendagri [Peraturan 
Menteri Dalam Negeri] no 15/1975) set up local Land Release Committees (Panitya Pem- 
bebasan Tanah) to implement the process.
After 1965, with the exception of the 1961 law on sharecropping and land reform (which 
will not be discussed in this paper), regulations to implement the UUP A, were never enact­
ed. Especially in Java, agrarian relations were politicized by the PKI-led land-reform cam­
paign of 1963-1965 to implement part of the UUPA. In the aftermath of the 1965 attempted 
Coup the entire Basic Agrarian Law became tarred with the same PKI brush. This further 
weakened the bargaining power of farmers under the New Order, vis-a-vis the stronger cap­
italist economic forces who were looking for land.9 Furthermore, after 1971, the state dis­
continued its annual budgetary allocations to finance the land-reform program, giving the 
impression that agrarian reform was "no longer a government priority."10 Yet today the 
UUPA is still on the statute books, and there are periodic calls for regulations to implement 
it. For example, such concepts as the "social function" of land, "public interest," and 
"reasonable compensation" have never been spelled out in a way that would enable land 
clearances to be more carefully regulated. Rather, new regulations have been formulated 
which landholders feel have encouraged development without protecting the rights of the 
economically weak proclaimed under the UUPA.
According to the UUPA, in order for the state to recognize title to land, all rights must be 
registered and certificates issued acknowledging category of ownership. This was the only 
way of providing legal security to landholders. While registration was made mandatory
8 Boedi Harsono, Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria: Sedjarah penjusunan isi dan pelaksanaanja (Jakarta: Djambatan, 
1971), p. 431.
9 Iman Soetiknja, Politik Agraria Nasional (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Press, 1990), pp. 95-96.
10 Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Latar Belakang Masalah-Masalah Pokok," in Laporan Interim: Masalah Pertanahan 
(Jakarta: Kementerian Riset Republic Indonesia, 1978), p. 14.
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under the law, no time limit was set on registration of land.11 As many landholders have 
found, subsequent regulations have empowered the government to expropriate land against 
the landholders' wishes, even if a certificate to the rights has been issued.
Issues Regarding Rights to Land
In all the land clearance cases surveyed, including the six mentioned by the Tanah untuk 
Rakyat calendar, two common issues are clear. In the majority of cases under review land­
holders have never registered their lands, because both of the cost and of the bureaucratic 
procedures involved. Thus the only proof of ownership or cultivation rights is the length of 
time they have been cultivating the land and their payment of all financial obligations. In an 
open letter to the Indonesian parliament, farmers from Belangguan in East Java pointed out 
that "these have been our ancestors' lands (tanah leluhur), since 1923, when our grandpar­
ents cleared the forest, and every year since then we have paid taxes."12
A second issue in all land clearance cases is compensation. One of the issues involved in 
the Kedung Ombo dam land clearance (see below) was the complaint that, if people had to 
leave their fertile ancestral wet-rice lands, the compensation should be adequate. There had 
been a culture of opposition to the Dutch in this region, where the graves of two folk heroes 
(important historical figures involved in the Diponegoro war of 1825-1830), as well as sacred 
sites connected with these heroes, were submerged along with thousands of family graves. 
Many elderly relatives, often in poor health, were reluctant to leave because of the ties with 
their land and their ancestors. In the Cilacap land dispute, dipossessed owners complained 
that the Rp.1000 compensation for removal of a grave meant that many had to leave their 
family ancestors behind on the site of the new petrochemical factory. Protesting the inade­
quate compensation, landholders carried the exhumed remains of their relatives in coffins 
on the back of bicycles around the villages.
Land Policy since 1965
No decree, no set of regulations or law holds good in Indonesia when it comes to land
appropriation. The land and the law belong to the powerful and the people with
money.13
The issue of land appropriation in Indonesia, and the increasing commercialization of 
land, reflects a number of trends since the beginning of the New Order. As was mentioned 
earlier, agrarian reform is no longer the priority it was before 1966. The early five-year de­
velopment programs of the New Order government emphasized increasing agricultural 
output, and this has made land more productive and increased its value to farmers. Agricul­
tural land close to major commercial centers has become valuable for joint venture projects 
with foreign investors. The rapidly increasing value of land as a commodity has attracted 
local speculators (cukong tanah, tengkulak), who buy up the land and resell it, making large 
profits. Although the Basic Agrarian Law made absentee land ownership illegal, such own­
11 Colin MacAndrews, Land Policy in Modem Indonesia: A Study of Land Issues in the New Order Period (Boston: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1986), p. 24.
12 The letter was signed with thumb prints by 80 landholders, with identity cards of 136 citizens of Belangguan 
village, "who request protection from a bomb threat." From student files of the Belangguan case.
13 Setiakawan, no.6 (July 1991), p. 12, English original. This issue of Setiakawan, the journal of SKEPHI, the NGO 
network for conservation in Indonesia, gives a wide-ranging coverage of recent land disputes throughout the 
country.
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ership is in fact increasing, and good agricultural land is being bought up by the urban 
middle class, as a form of investment in the future.14
Tourism, the garment industry, and the footwear industry are three rapidly expanding 
economic sectors that require land in close proximity to, if not within, the big urban centers. 
Government departments need land for office expansion. In urban areas Indonesian con­
glomerates have been working with local government authorities to buy land for hotels, 
shopping plazas, and office blocks. In rural areas, conglomerates have consolidated their 
control over former state forest areas which are being cleared for agricultural crops.15
Implementation of land-use policy is a complex process. It involves different govern­
ment departments, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the BPN (Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional, National Council for Land Affairs) which now has national responsibility for land 
policy, replacing the former Directorate General of Agrarian Affairs. The dimensions of the 
problem of implementing land policy in Indonesia today are clear from comments made by 
the Indonesian Legal Aid Service (LBH). The number of laws, acts, regulations, and instruc­
tions which have been promulgated since the UUPA was passed in 1960 have made it diffi­
cult to give legal advice in land disputes. The Legal Aid Service has reported problems in 
keeping itself fully aware of new legislation being enacted at various levels.16 Local gov­
ernments, on the one hand, should defend the rights of individual citizens, and, on the 
other, actively promote development projects in their respective regions. Let us briefly 
examine the main areas where conflict arises in the context of three of the case studies.
The Cimacan Case
"Don't value land cultivated for many years at only 30 rupiah per square meter!" Minis­
ter of Home Affairs Rudini's comment on compensation offered to 287 farmers of
Rarahan hamlet, Cimacan village, Cianjur, West Java.17
The level of compensation for landholders who have been told that their lands are to be 
appropriated for development projects is the central issue in the Cimacan dispute. Article 18 
of the Basic Agrarian Law states, as we have seen, states that the government must pay 
adequate compensation (ganti rugi yang layak), according to regulations which were never 
promulgated. Fifteen years later a Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri no. 
15/1975) created Land Release Committees (Panitia Pembebasan Tanah) to determine the level 
of compensation for people who have lost their land to a private or government 
development project. These Committees are constituted in such a way that they have no 
landholders' representatives. So when a level of compensation is set for the land it is often 
below both market price and the cost to the farmer of finding alternative land of similar 
productivity. The obligatory deliberations (musyawarah) to reach an agreement on the price 
of the land are reduced to a meeting at the local village or district office when local officials 
inform landholders of the Committee's decision on compensation. There is no mechanism 
for solving disputes if the process of musyawarah does not result in agreement, nor is there 
an authority to whom the land owner can appeal. Under the UUPA of 1960 landholders
14 Kuntowidjoyo, "Keadilan Sosial di Pedesaan," in Prospek Pedesaan 1987, ed. Mubyarto et al. (Yogyakarta, P3PK 
UGM, 1987), pp. 109-15.
15 The cover story "Liem mengkavling Riau," appeared in Prospek, September 21,1991, pp. 86-97.
16 Abdurachman, "Aspek2 Pokok Hukum Agraria," Radar 27 (September-October 1987): 16-17.
17 The compensation was being offered to farmers by a private developer building a golf course in Cimacan. 
Kompas, July 24,1989, quoted in Arnold Purba, Biarkan Ratyat Bicara: Tartgan Besi Merampas Tanah Kami. Pembelaan 
Didepan PengadUan Negeri Bandung untuk Men jawed) Semua Tuntutan Penguasa Negeri in kepada Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
(Bandung, January 27,1990), p. 62
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who suffer financial loss could appeal to a court, but Permendagri 15/1975 does not give 
them this right. In the Kedung Ombo dispute, landholders who have sought justice through 
the local courts against the government have lost their cases.18 Under the same law, the 
village headman is a member of the Land Release Committee. He has to protect the interests 
of his people, but in the "era of development" policy of the New Order he must be 
supportive of government or private interests needing land for development projects.
The Cimacan dispute highlighted the powerlessness of farmers to fight unjust compen­
sation unless supported by a powerful official, and the importance of the attitude of the 
village headman. In Cimacan village the headman declared that 33 hectares of land, origi­
nally held under a long term lease (erfpacht verponding) by a European plantation but since 
1943 actively farmed by (in 1989) 287 farmers, was village land and therefore officially at his 
disposal. Without consulting the villagers concerned, this land was leased to a developer,
PT Bandung Asria Mulia (BAM), for 30 years, for a golf course forming part of a local tourist 
park development. The 287 farmers affected had begun cultivating the land in 1943, paying 
a total annual rent of Rp. 1.4 million to the village, although the village claimed to receive 
only Rp. 300,000. As the company was offering only token payment (referred to locally as 
uang pengjeujeuh), the dispute continued for several months. There was intervention from 
various notable figures, including Minister for Home Affairs Rudini, Minister Coordinator 
for Politics and Security Sudomo, and Chairman of the National Council for Land Affairs 
(Badan Pertanahan Nasional or BPN) Sony Harsono. None of these interventions helped the 
farmers, who in late August 1989 decided to cultivate their land again under a poster which 
read "We live off this land. Let us go on living as farmers!" The headman's comment was: 
'The land is owned by the village, so if the people are not given compensation it actually 
doesn't matter."19 The Cimacan farmers also took their case to the national parliament, the 
DPR, to which landholders often appeal for assistance in land disputes, and the matter was 
again referred to the BPN. However the construction of the golf course has apparently 
proceeded.
The Kedung Ombo Project.
. . .  The implementation of the resettlement plans and land compensation rates [for the 
Kedung Ombo project] was left to local government, in particular the district 
[kabupaten] authorities. From the start confusion, uncertainty and secrecy marked the 
process, whether in the planning or the implementation stages. In the end, from the 
point of view of the majority of the villagers, the process was noteworthy only for the 
outright hostility which government officials showed them.20
Beginning in 1982 the provincial government of Central Java began setting compensa­
tion rates and developing resettlement plans for more than 5,000 families from 37 villages in 
7 subdistricts who were to be moved for a huge dam financed largely by the World Bank. 
Construction started in October 1985, and flooding of 6,576 hectares of farmland began in 
January 1989. The functions of the Kedung Ombo dam include tourism, flood control,
18 Landholders who took their cases to court in Semarang and Boyolali, claiming compensation for loss of sawah, 
house gardens, houses, and other possessions, and for loss of two years harvest, claiming they had been unjustly 
smeared with ex-tapol (ex-political prisoner) stamped on their identity cards, lost their cases, and their appeal. 
Other cases are being prepared. Romo Mangunwijaya, "Situasi dan saran tentang resettlement penduduk Kedung 
Ombo sekarang," (Yogyakarta, February 20,1991), pp. 8-9.
19 Kompas, July 22,1989, quoted in Purba, Biarkan Rakyat Bicara, p. 61. For a summary of the Cimacan case see 
YLBHI [Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum] and JARIM [Jaringan Informasi Masyarakat], Laporan Khusus/ Case 
Report, (Kedung Ombo, Kasus Arso, Cimacan), vol. 2 (June 1991), pp. 91-99.
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irrigating 70,000 hectares of new rice lands, and the production of 22.5 megawatts of 
electricity.20 1
Compensation rates paid to landholders were inadequate and never accepted as fair by 
the farmers, partly because the farmers themselves were never included in negotiations. The 
quality of the land in the resettlement sites in the region was much poorer, while villagers 
no longer could be persuaded to transmigrate to other islands. Although the dam has been 
flooded for over a year, and was formally opened by the President in March 1991, approxi­
mately 600 (now reported to be 1,000) families still live in the green belt above the water-line 
of the dam, now a vast inland lake. It was to these people that the President addressed his 
remarks at the opening ceremony, when he said that he understood how difficult it was for 
farmers to leave their ancestral farmlands, but that people were being asked to make sacri­
fices "for the greater good" (kepentingan yang lebih besar). Referring to those who had not 
moved, he said the government would not increase the compensation, because it would not 
be fair to those who had already accepted payment. He would also regret it if a group of 
them were to become known as resisters (kelompok mbalelo) in the future. The President told 
the assembled farmers and invited dignitaries that the people had two alternatives: to 
transmigrate to other islands, or to move their villages to land previously managed by the 
Forestry Department where they would be issued with certificates of title.22
The Kedung Ombo dam project highlights another set of conflicts which arise in com­
pulsory land acquisition, namely relations between landholders and local government offi­
cials. Attitudes towards individual projects and the mechanism for solving disputes vary 
considerably between levels of local government. Officials often appear patronizing, 
manipulative, sometimes intimidatory. Since the beginning of the project officials have used 
threats and intimidation to persuade villagers to accept compensation rates and resettlement 
plans. Kedung Ombo residents had to sign a document with thumb prints after being told it 
related to taxation. The same document was produced later as evidence that the landholders 
had agreed to compensation offered by the government. Then a number of villagers, having 
submitted their personal identity cards for routine renewal, had them returned with 
stamped initials marking them as former political prisoners or members of now-banned 
organizations, making them vulnerable to all kinds of bureaucratic or political pressure.23
Indirect political pressure also comes from local DPRD (Regional People's Consultative 
Assemblies) which often seem uninformed about the facts and issues surrounding particular 
disputes. The chairman of Boyali kabupaten DPRD (which represents a large number of 
villages affected by the Kedung Ombo dam) said it was untrue that the Kedung Ombo fami­
lies who refused to move and sought better compensation for their fertile rice lands were 
anti Panca Sila or anti-development. The Boyolali Golkar chairman said "There is no evi­
dence that they are anti government, they are not yet aware [belunt sadar]."24
The Urip Sumoharjo Dispute
The 26 hectares of urban land in Surabaya now under dispute are home to roughly 4,600 
families or a total of 19,000 people, administered by seven kampung associations (RW or
20 Laporan Kasus/Case Report, vol.2 (June 1991), p. 22 (English original).
21 Tempo, May 25,1991, p. 22.
22 Ibid.
23 Laporan Kasus/Case Report, vol 2 (June 1991), p. 23
24 Stanley, "Seputar Kedung Ombo," typscript prepared for a seminar in Salam, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 
May 19-20,1990, p. 154.
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rukun warga) under two different village administrations (kelurahan). Centrally located and 
accessible to public health and cheap public transport, the area is supplied with electricity 
and telephones, has good ground water, no wet-season flooding, and comparatively little 
pollution (it is not an industrial area). Being close to city markets, kampung people can buy 
basic necessities cheaply. The majority are self-employed in a wide range of activities, par­
ticularly running food-selling and motor-bike repair businesses. Also a minority of them 
work in the armed forces or in the government. Residents have inherited their houses and 
claim they have been living in the area —in Keputran, Pandegiling, and Kedondong kam- 
pungs—for up to five generations. They belong to no village or kampung elsewhere, and 
reject the idea they are illegal residents.25
The dispute originated with a fire in 1983 which destroyed the Horizon supermarket on 
Jl. Urip Sumoharjo and 81 kampung dwellings on the west side of this main Surabaya thor­
oughfare. The municipal government refused to allow the owners to rebuild their dwellings; 
instead, the ailing Mayor of Surabaya suddenly announced plans for kampung renewal, and 
a private developer was contracted to build flats. After living in makeshift accommodation 
for two years, people moved in and started paying rent to the government.26
Surabaya's "obsession to become a metropolis" has, since 1988, encouraged developers 
to invest in this provincial capital of East Java. This development has resulted in increasing 
competition to obtain land, and sky-rocketing prices, particularly after the municipal gov­
ernment declared the area part of a new central business district. Adjacent to the disputed 
land there are now four hotels, two shopping plazas, two banks, and an office block, while 
two commercial office towers and a 5-star hotel are either planned or under construction.27
As with the other land clearance disputes, the main issue is compensation. The devel­
oper, PT Karya Yudha Sakti (a company controlled by the President's brother-in-law Sud- 
wikatmono), offered the residents three choices: new high-density housing on the same site, 
alternative housing on the edge of the city, or cash payments. Most inhabitants chose cash, 
but rejected the amount of compensation offered by the Mayor of Surabaya, which was 
based on whether the site was classified as business or residential and on the quality of the 
building. In supporting the developers, the assistant to the Mayor of South Surabaya quoted 
verses of the Qur'an to explain that by accepting low compensation for their land the people 
showed that they were able "to live with a state of loss."28
Local military officers have intervened without any success to help solve the dispute. 
One kampung head offered local residents cheap loans on condition they accepted the rates 
of compensation offered. Residents continually requested a meeting with the developer, but 
the developer denied that his company was acting as a (private) investor, but rather as a 
project contractor for the government. Local residents feel that once the government pos­
sesses the land it will sell it to the developer, although officials keep emphasizing that it is 
"a local government project." Why, then are the hotels, shops, office blocks, being financed 
privately? the people ask.
25 "Pembebasan Urip Sumoharjo/'typescript, November (?) 1991, p. 3.
26 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
27 "Jawa Timur 1991, Kebijakan dan Problema: Aib birokrasi ditengah melonjaknya Harga Tanah," fawa Pos, 
December 24,1991; "Pembebasan Urip Sumoharjo," p. 13.
28 "Pembebasan Urip Sumoharjo',"p. 25. The assistant mayor only quoted the first two verses "Demi masa 
sesungguhnya manusia itu dalam kerugian" but the Surat Al-'Ashr continues "kecuali orang-orang yang 
berimam dan ber'amal salih dan berwasiat dengan kebenaran dan berwasiat dengan kesabaran," 105:1-3, in H. 
Mahmud Junus, Tarjamah Al Quran Al Karim (Bandung: Al-Ma'Arif, 1988), p. 540.
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Appeals to the national parliament and to Minister of Home Affairs Rudini have also not 
produced a solution, although Rudini has visited Surabaya and talked with residents' action 
groups. As of the time of writing the dispute is still not settled.
Attitudes of the Minister of Home Affairs
National-level officials, and members of the Indonesian parliament often send out con­
tradictory signals regarding land clearances. Minister of Home Affairs Rudini is in fact the 
most prominent national-level government official involved in land disputes, because his 
ministry, together with the National Council for Land Affairs, is responsible for the admin­
istration of the land clearances. In the Cimacan dispute discussed earlier, Rudini at first 
responded positively to the farmers' protests, but in the end he backed the authority of the 
local village headman and, by implication, the developer, advising farmers to accept the 
compensation offered.
Landholders who bring their complaints to the Ministry of Home Affairs seem to get a 
fair hearing from Rudini or his staff. At least his public statements indicate sympathy for 
their plight. He is often also critical of officials in his own ministry, saying that the numbers 
of protesters coming to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta with grievances about land 
show that local government has "failed to give leadership."29 He questions the meaning of 
public interest, asking if a supermarket is in the public interest, then in whose public inter­
est.30 He suggests that the term penggusuran should be replaced by the "purchase of land for 
development projects."31 In Cimacan he warned the village headman not to be a "victim of 
the flattery of businessmen," because in the end "it is the farmers who suffer."32 In Surabaya 
Rudini listened to people whose land was being appropriated for hotel and office shopping 
plaza redevelopment, criticizing municipal officials who "have just read out their decision 
regarding compensation, without giving the people a chance to speak."33 He has also told 
the press in Surabaya that "local government must not be the spokesperson for business,"34 
and has declined the invitation of the Surabaya municipal government to lay the foundation 
stone for the Urip Sumoharjo development project, on the grounds that there is still no 
agreement on compensation between the government and the people who are being 
evicted.35 When over one hundred landholders from Cilacap arrived in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Rudini made an unscheduled appearance in the car-park, and in a much 
publicized dialogue, gave an impression of openness and a genuine willingness to listen to 
grievances.36 At the beginning of the Kedung Ombo protests he was receptive to student 
involvement. After students told him he was getting a one-sided version of the dispute, he 
agreed to open up alternative sources of information apart from official government chan­
nels, with a student task force formed to work with landholders in Kedung Ombo. At the 
same meeting, he told student leaders not to listen to outside influences and stated that the 
majority of the people who didn't want to move were ex-PKI. He promised to act immedi­
29 Media, January 14,1991; Institute of Legal Aid (LBH) newspaper files.
30 Angkatan Bersenjata, January 3,1991; LBH newspaper files.
31 Pildran Rakyat, January 3,1991; LBH newspaper files.
32 Kompas, July 24,1989, in Biarkan Rakyat Bicara, p. 62. However, after talking with the headman in question, 
Rudini backed down, saying that he only meant the project should be halted until the dispute was solved.
33 Media Indonesia, January 3,1991, in Rakyat VS Shell: Pengalaman Kasus Tanah Rakyat Cilacap, distributed by 
Sekerep [Serikat Kesetiakawanan Rakyat Cilacap] (Yogyakarta, 1990).
34 "Pembebasan Tanah Urip Sumoharjo," p. 15
35 Retorika, 5 ,2  (1991), p. 16.
36 Pos Kota, November 13,1990, Sinar Pagi, November 13,1990, in Rakyat VS.Shell.
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ately against government officials who manipulated compensation payments.37 Rudini's 
liberal attitude apparently was not reflected in decisions favorable to landholders.
Rudini's public statements are in contrast to those of provincial-level officials, and 
members of the provincial-level DPRDs. On November 13,1990, the day after 400 landhold­
ers from Cilacap protested to the national parliament, Governor H. Ismail set up a 24-Hour 
Commando Post (Posko 24 jam), where people in Central Java could take their disputes con­
cerning land.38 The Governor announced the cultural principle on which Posko was based, 
namely ono rembug, ya dirembug, in other words "discuss your problems with us, don't 
protest."39
The Governor of Central Java in general reacts negatively to farmers' protests about low 
levels of compensation. He complained that the leaders of the Cilacap protests were 
"stirrers," not "real farmers," charging that the people who masterminded the Cilacap 
protests were the same as those who organized the Kedung Ombo dam actions.40 One of 
Governor Ismail's most publicized decisions was his refusal to give Catholic activist priest 
and novelist Y.B. Mangunwijaya permission to set up a school program for the 3,500 chil­
dren who were unable to get to school after the flooding that occurred as the dam was 
filling. This publicized the plight of the inhabitants who had refused to move out of the 
region but had tried to dismantle their houses and move to higher ground before the water 
level reached them.
Student Perceptions of Land Disputes
Student groups have been involved in disputes with landholders over rights to land and 
over levels of compensation since 1989. All levels of government have been wary of outside 
influence, particularly that of students, and have tried to drive a wedge between the stu­
dents and landholders. In Cilacap, security officers only allowed landholders holding ID 
cards as proof they were residents in the disputed area to meet the regional head to discuss 
level of compensation. The local government closed off the Kedung Ombo communities and 
refused to allow students to enter the region. However student involvement continued in a 
number of ways.
First, students provided support, through legal advice and information networks and 
through organization of many of the protest actions to the parliament and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs or to local government officials. Where there are detentions, or court cases 
pending (as in the Badega, Cilacap, and Kedung Ombo disputes), students have arranged 
legal aid. Student action groups formed around each land case provide first-hand accounts 
of developments, giving a different perspective from the ones appearing in the Indonesian 
daily press. Some student groups find places in educational institutions in their own cities 
for children of the community leaders with whom they are working.
37 See Stanley, Seputar Kedung Ombo, pp. 96-98.
38 Suara Merdeka, November 15,1990 in Rakyat VS Shell.
39 Ibid., Media Indonesia, January 3,1991 in Rakyat VS. Shell. "Ona rembug, ya dirembug" is the kind of advice 
Javanese parents would give recalcitrant children, "don't go and act foolishly, discuss it with your family first."
40 Governor Ismail calls the protesting landholders oknum.2 WTS. WTS usually means prostitute (wanita tuna 
susila) but the Governor means waton sulaya, or talking in an argumentative way with negative results. He also 
calls the leadership of protests "jumping bedbugs" (kutu loncat) a reference to the same student leadership of 
different land disputes, and "sate sellers" who fan the flames of discontent. Suara Merdeka, August 11,1990; 
Media Indonesia, August 14,1990 in Rakyat VS. Shell.
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However, the students are split on the strategies to use in working with the people in­
volved in the disputes. Some students regard disgruntled landholders as an instrument for 
provoking an issue around which political opposition can be mobilized. This view is de­
scribed (at least by its opponents) as the rakyat sebagai alat provokasi approach.
Another approach emphasizes training cadres, based on the felt needs of the local peo­
ple, or as one student put it: "We should be dealing with the issues rather than with the 
masses, organizing around issues; otherwise, the people are just a tool."41 Another student 
view is that student involvement should be aimed primarily at raising the consciousness of 
the rural poor concerning their rights, with the foremost aim to create an alliance between 
urban and rural poor.
Over the past eighteen months, student involvement in the landholders' dispute with 
the Indonesian Airforce in Jatiwangi has shown concrete results, at least according to the 
activists themselves. It is claimed that the people can cultivate their land without being 
"taxed" 30 percent of the harvest by the airforce; they now have greater access to all the dis­
puted land; and a new commander of the local airforce base has announced publicly his 
willingness to enter a dialogue with farmers.42
Nevertheless, results in general have been disappointing, especially to the activists 
themselves who speak about the poor organizational skills of their fellow activists, poor 
management of funds, and competition between different factions for influence amongst 
village leaders.43 The same pattern of student involvement re-occurs in the disputes, with 
different groups competing with each other, with intrigues, no self-evaluation, overlapping 
of activities, and lack of focus.44 The relationship between student groups and NGOs, char­
acterized by mistrust and lack of cooperation on both sides, also makes any joint action 
difficult.
The Future
The penggusuran tanah issue continues to simmer away in the lead-up to the election. 
Efforts by ICMI, the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association, to find a solution to the 
problem of the remaining landholders who refuse to move from Kedung Ombo produced 
nothing concrete. Muslim cultural activist Emha Ainun Nadjib, who was promoting a role 
for the organization in the dispute, has resigned from ICMI in protest against the bureau­
cratic procedures followed, which prevented further compensation being offered; against 
the refusal of the Kedung Ombo project engineers to allow more than 50 percent of the 
green belt above the dam's high-water mark to be used for resettlement; and against the 
President's reference to those landholders who refused to move as resisters or protesters 
(kaunt mbalelo).
There has been no follow-up to the promising statement made by Minister of Home 
Affairs Rudini in January 1991 that the Permendagri no 15 1975 would be reformed to con­
struct a mechanism whereby compensation payments for landholders would be more 
equitably determined.45 Rudini's most recent proposal has been that compensation for
41 Interview with student activists, Yogyakarta, September 1991.
42 Suara Rakyat, no 7, July 1,1991.
43 This has been a characteristic of the Cilacap case. "Pergulatan di Tengah Massa" (typescript, Yogyakarta, 
1991), pp. 29-30.
44 "Perkembangan Permasalahan Kasus Tanah Jatiwangi" (typescript, Surabaya, October 11,1990, student files).
45 Media Indonesia, January 3,1991, LBH files.
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landholders should include replacement housing provided by the project developer who is 
buying the people's land.46
The broader question remains the social cost to the government of these continuing 
disputes, which began in the early 1980s but which have greatly intensified since 1989. Con­
sultative processes and other formal procedures, whereby landholders whose legal and 
political position is weak obtain fair compensation, are not working in the majority of the 
disputes. Indeed, there has been press speculation that so-called vocal ABRI members of the 
National Assembly, such as Police Colonel Roekmini Koesoemasti, have lost their nomina­
tion as appointed members of the next parliament because of their public support for those 
who bring their land disputes to the DPR.47
Landholders still refuse to accept the decisions regarding compensation for their land 
which have been forced on them by local government and developers, although the land is 
often taken over anyway. The government fears that the disputes are being politicized by 
forces from outside the village, and indeed students are active in nearly all the land clear­
ances, as are NGOs. National-level bureaucrats and members of the National Assembly, and 
most of the daily press, say they want change but the state seems powerless to implement it.
46 Editor, September 7,1991.
47 Jakart Pos, April 1,1992.
